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Abstract
Environmental Cross Compliance is one policy by means by which government can seek
to influence farmers so that they to give greater weight to environmental goods in their
decisions.  The policy is evaluated from both a theoretical and pragmatic viewpoint and
its strengths and weaknesses are discussed.  The necessary conditions for the success of
environmental cross compliance policies are identified and problems with its
implementation are highlighted.
Introduction
Until recently, much agricultural policy was centred on the need to provide food
security for a growing urban population. This was to be achieved by encouraging
technically efficient farming practices and investment in new technologies.  The
resulting ‘productivist’ policies have been so successful that food shortages - at least in
developed countries - are now considered to be a thing of the past.  However, it is
increasingly accepted that the success of this policy has been achieved at a cost.  That
cost is the damage that agriculture does to the environment, both in its consumption of
natural resources and its production of pollutants.  As awareness of these problems has
risen, so policy makers have attempted to redesign policy measures so that they meet
the twin objectives of providing support for agriculture and, at the same time, limiting
environmental damage.  The name given to this concept is environmental cross
compliance. The term originated in the US where farmers wishing to participate in one
programme had also to meet conditions in a second programme (Benbrook, 1994).
However usage has since broadened to include more general linkages between
agricultural and environmental policies.2
The Development of Environmental Cross Compliance
Environmental cross compliance (ECC) may thus be defined as the linking of
environmental conditions to the receipt of agricultural support payments (Baldock and
Mitchell, 1995).  This is a relatively recent policy option that has been introduced in
recognition that rational responses by farmers to price signals from some agricultural
support measures can lead to damage to the environment.  While ECC is a relatively
recent concept, it is not the first instance in the UK of agricultural policy where there
has been a trade off between price support and some desired effect.  An example from
the middle of the last century was the 1947 Agriculture Act that introduced price
guarantee measures to support farmers’ incomes.  At the same time the Act gave the
Government powers to remove those farmers who failed to practise good husbandry.
Although this power was seldom used and eventually discarded, agricultural landlords
still retain the right to evict tenant farmers who fail to practise good husbandry.
ECC was first explicitly introduced in the 1985 US Farm Bill.  Examples of ECC
policies in the United States are:
•   the ‘Sod Buster’ programme that discouraged ploughing up of erodible land and
requires farmers to implement a conservation plan,
•   the ‘Swamp Buster’ programme that withdrew eligibility for farm support from
farmers who planted arable crops on land converted from wetland in the period since
1985.
More recently in the European Union, ECC was introduced into the Common
Agricultural policy as part of the Agenda 2000 package at the European Council
meeting in Berlin in March 1999 (EU Council, 1999).  The Regulation can be applied to
all direct payments drawing on European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund
except those paid under the Rural Development Regulation 1257/1999 (Dwyer, Baldock
and Einshutz, 2000).  Member states have to ensure that national ECC regulations
conform to guidelines set out in Council Regulation 1259/1999.3
In the UK, examples of ECC include stocking density restrictions that are used to
constrain or prevent overgrazing under the Sheep Annual Premium Scheme, the Beef
Special Premium Scheme, Suckler Cow Premium Scheme, Extensification Premium
and Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances under the Less Favoured Area scheme.
Specific provisions that are designed to protect habitats and species in cultivated land
are made conditions for farmers who claim arable area payments and set-aside payments
under the Arable Area Payments System (AAPS).
Alternative Forms of Environmental Cross Compliance
A number of variants of ECC have been proposed and these can be classified as follows
(Batie and Sappington, 1986, Baldock and Mitchell, op cit):
•   Red ticket approach where there is partial or complete withdrawal of agricultural
support if a farmer does not comply with a pre-determined set of environmental
conditions.
•   Orange ticket approach where eligibility for agricultural support payments is
dependent on farmer enrolment in an otherwise voluntary agri-environmental
scheme.
•   Green ticket approach where payments in addition to standard agricultural support
are offered to farmers who exceed a given set of environmental standards.
It is worth noting at this stage that the Green ticket approach cannot properly be
regarded as an ECC measure since payments are in addition to standard levels of
support. On the other hand, both Red and Orange versions imply some specified
minimum level of environmental quality to be achieved as a condition for the receipt of
agricultural support.
The Production of Environmental Goods and Agricultural Products.
Before developing specific proposals as to where EEC policies might be useful, it is
appropriate to investigate a generalised model of the relationship between the
production of agricultural commodities and the provision of environmental benefits.4
McInerney has shown how the relationship may be viewed in two-dimensional space
(McInerney, Turner, Barr and MacQueen, 2000).  So-called ‘environmental benefits’
were classified rather more explicitly as CARE goods (Conservation, Amenity
Recreation and Environment) but for the purpose of the argument, the precise definition
is not important, he suggested a relationship as drawn in figure 1.  With no agriculture, a
level of CARE goods, R, is produced.  However, between points R and S, there is a
complementary relationship between agricultural production and CARE goods.  (It is
worth noting that arguments for supporting agricultural production on the basis of
‘multi-functionality’ rely on the existence of complementarity).  CARE goods are
maximised at point S and, as agricultural production increases, a competitive
relationship sets in to point U where production is maximised and some level of CARE
goods is foregone.  Beyond point U, the environment becomes degraded (e.g. soil
erosion, lack of natural predators etc.) such that agricultural production is also reduced
at point V.















Simple production economics tells us that the profit maximising farmer will operate
where the rate of substitution for his resources between CARE goods and agricultural
products is equal to their inverse price ratio.
∆ CARE / ∆ AP  = PAP / PCARE
where PAP is the price per unit of agricultural product and PCARE  is the price per unit of
the CARE goods. The difficulty is that CARE goods are generally unpriced so the
incentives to the profit maximising farmer are to maximise agricultural production at
point U. If  PCARE  is zero, the isorevenue line is vertical and the farmer operates at U,
providing a level of CARE goods at C1  and a level of agricultural products at A1.
Suppose society wishes to move to point T on the frontier where the provision of CARE
goods is increased from C1 to  C2, the issue then is how best to achieve the necessary
adjustment in farmer behaviour.
One alternative is to value the CARE goods and to price them in such a way that the
slope of the new iso-revenue curve for farmers, PP, induces the farmers to operate at
point T. Unfortunately, except in some very specific circumstances, it is difficult either
to set an appropriate social price for the various components of CARE goods or to
create a market such that they are valued automatically.  But the above analysis does
emphasize that, for a move to T to take place, the price which would need to be attached
to the CARE goods is highly dependent upon the rate of substitution between
agricultural production and those CARE goods.  The point is that such benefits may be
relatively cheap to obtain in some cases, whilst in others they may be relatively
expensive.
A second alternative is to follow the ECC route and to specify the desired level of
CARE goods, making the receipt of support payments for agricultural products
conditional upon achievement of the desired level. By tying the eligibility for payments
to the provision of an identifiable level of CARE goods, the policy puts a constraint on
production such that C2 must be produced if farmers are to receive the payments.  The6
way in which farmers will adjust their systems to move from U to T will depend on the
details of the scheme and on the flexibility of their resource base.
It will be noted in passing that there is a third alternative, which is to place regulations
around farming systems such that it becomes illegal to farm in a way which does not
provide the required CARE goods. Whilst such an approach is widely used to control
what might be termed ‘negative’ CARE goods, such as pollution emissions from
intensive livestock operations, it is difficult to see it operating to increase the production
of many ‘positive’ CARE goods, such as populations of emblematic birds, rare insect
species and other desirable environmental benefits.
Farmers’ Response to Environmental Cross Compliance Schemes.
Farmers’ adjustments in response to a given ECC policy will depend to some extent
upon the mechanism of the support payments scheme for which compliance is required.
Support payments may relate to holdings, to areas of crops, to numbers of livestock or
to physical production levels.  These differences in support payments may be predicted
to lead to different farmer responses in terms of area cropped, yields achieved and to the
amounts of variable inputs applied.  Table 1 summarises the possible reactions by
farmers to ECC measures in relation to the different categories of support payment
being received.
If the support payments are fixed per farm, then farmer adjustments in response to ECC
are likely to include changes in the cropping system and also in the use of variable
costs, since there is nothing to be gained by retaining either a specific cropped area or a
specific level of input use in the face of declining product prices.  If the support
payments are paid on a per hectare basis, there is less likely to be an adjustment in the
number of hectares planted (since this would result in diminished payments) but there
might be a shift to lower production levels per hectare and in attendant variable costs.
Finally, if the support payments system is product price based and so not decoupled
from production, farmers are unlikely to change either the area planted or the production
techniques employed; rather, they would look for other ways to provide the CARE
goods that are required to demonstrate compliance and so ensure continued receipt of
product support.7
Table 1. Effect of Decoupling of Support from Production upon Likely Farm
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The above analysis has implications for the way that the desired CARE goods can best
be delivered by ECC.  If they are most likely to be supplied as a result of reduced use of
variable inputs and reduced cropping intensities, then ECC payments should be
designed around schemes that involve payments per farm, rather than per hectare or per
tonne produced.  In other words, the more decoupled the payments are from production,
the more responsive farmers are likely to be in their reaction to the cross compliance
requirement.
But that is not the end of the problem.  Major difficulties with any ECC scheme arise as
a consequence of the heterogeneity of farms within countries such as the UK.  Farms
differ with respect to size, production systems, resource base and existing endowment of8
environmental capital.  Thus any ECC scheme should take account of these variables if
it is to deliver the desired outcomes in a coherent and consistent manner.
Practical problems with the implementation of ECC policies
There are a number of practical issues that must be addressed if ECC is to be an
appropriate tool for changing farmer behaviour in a desired direction.
Firstly, if a scheme is to influence the farmer at all, he or she has to be producing a
supported commodity. For example, without direct EU support, producers in the dairy,
pigs, poultry, fruit, vegetables and flowers sectors will not be amenable to pressure.
Producers in other sectors will vary in their susceptibility to ECC measures to the extent
to which they are dependant upon programs such as the IACS system. The coverage of
an ECC scheme is thus not necessarily dependant upon the required CARE goods, but
rather on the extent and nature of the support already provided.
Secondly, the problems of setting and monitoring appropriate standards as the basis of
the compliance scheme must not be underestimated.  Direct measurements will be
costly and subject to a good deal of variability.  It is easier to monitor some variables
such as pollution levels, than others such as bio-diversity or the abundance of rare
species.
Thirdly, even if appropriate standards could be set for producers of supported
commodities, we can expect there to be major differences in the costs of compliance on
different farms.  In terms of figure 1, the rate of substitution between agriculture
production and CARE goods will differ between farms.  Thus the level of production
disincentive needed to achieve the chosen environmental standards will differ greatly
between farms.
Fourthly, and as a consequence of the above, the regulator who must set the levels of the
disincentive will not generally know the costs of compliance.  Individual farmers are
best placed to know the costs of compliance on their own farms, whereas policy makers
are not. There is thus ‘information asymmetry’ in the design of ECC schemes, that may9
lead to over compensation in some cases, or under compensation and non-compliance in
others.
What the above discussion means is that, for any ECC system to work, a considerable
bureaucracy would have to be created. Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort (1999)
analysed such a system in which the regulator chose the level of support withheld; the
probability of being monitored; the level of fine if farmers did not comply but claimed
otherwise, and the environmental conditions to be complied within.  Using standard
welfare economics, their analysis suggested that the ECC was most effective where the
regulator maximised both the level of support withheld for non-compliance and the
level of fine for defaulting participants.  Maximising society’s welfare was conditional
upon the environmental benefits being gained from the ECC scheme being greater that
the farmer’s compliance costs in each case, together with the costs of administration and
monitoring.  They concluded that this rather brutal and not necessarily efficient regime
was unlikely to find favour.
A more fundamental criticism of the principle of ECC is that it violates one of
Tinbergen’s (1952) prescriptions for optimal policy design, namely that there should be
at least as many policy instruments as there are policy objectives.  With a single policy
instrument (ECC) and two policy objectives (agricultural production and environmental
goods) there are bound to be trade-offs, which are likely to lead to sub-optimality.
More generally, systems theorists will recognise yet another application of Ashby’s Law
of Requisite Variety, which states that variety within a regulatory system must equal
variety found in the system which it is attempting to regulate Checkland (1981). As
Checkland observes, regulatory schemes which do not obey Ashby’s Law can be built;
but they will not be very good ones.  Proponents of multi-functionality might dispute
this difficulty, but we would argue on the basis of Figure 1 that multi-functionality only
exists over a restricted range of production (RS in figure 1).  Society’s interest lies
within competitive range (SU).
The Future for Environmental Cross Compliance
Although the concept of ECC has achieved support from some environmental and
farmer organisations, it does have limitations as argued above.  The most fundamental10
criticism is that ECC is based on a link between agricultural support measures and
environmentally positive practices.  If agricultural support is reduced, or, worse, if it is
absent, then ECC loses its power of sanction.  A scenario of reduced agricultural
support is widely regarded as inevitable within the present EU as a result of pressure
from the World Trade Organisation. The proposed enlargement of the EU to include the
CEEC countries raises further questions about the role of ECC as some argue that the
CEEC countries should have only a limited version of the CAP (Buckwell and
Tangermann, 1999). Another question mark over ECC is its ability to deal with the
range of negative environmental externalities that agriculture produces.  The
environmental impact of agriculture is wide and encompasses damage to natural capital
such as water, air, soil, biodiversity and landscape, and to human health through
chemical residues and disease agents (Pretty et al, 2000).  In many cases, especially
those relating to human health, direct control of farming practices through legislation is
regarded as the most effective means of limiting or stopping such externalities.  In other
cases education or targeted environmental subsidies may be more effective.
Conclusion
In this paper we have described ECC, examined the theory underpinning ECC and
assessed possible farmer response to it.  While it is evident that ECC is not a panacea –
depending as it does on an the existence of a support payment system -  it is not totally
without merit.  Linking the receipt of agricultural support to the need to act in a way that
in environmentally beneficial does help to raise farmer awareness of the environment as
an agricultural output.  Giving environmental goods a financial value, even indirectly,
means that farmers will grow used to including them in their management and resource
allocation decisions.  Society, too, will become used to the idea that the environment
produced by agriculture is not a free good and that it is logical to pay farmers to produce
what the public values.   However it is only one step on the way to providing an
efficient market mechanism for the rural economy.
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